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LEGAL MALPRACTICE

THE STATE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
IN OKLAHOMA
For a good many years the bar has been keenly aware of
the large volume of litigation that takes place in the area of
medical malpractice. The verdicts and settlements arising out
of such actions have made headlines in newspapers throughout
the land. Due to the sheer volume of medical malpractice
suits, and the large money verdicts involved, it is no surprise
that the area of medical malpractice has developed into a
specialty among members of the trial bar. The volume of litigation in the area of legal malpractice has not, as yet, reached
this level and, at the present time, there is an extraordinary
dearth of Oklahoma case law relating to the professional liability of the attorney. But one cannot expect this situation to
continue. For a long time the concept of privity of contract
limited the attorney's liability to the pecuniary losses suffered
by his client. In the early 1960's, in the now famous case of
Lucas v. Hamm,' the Supreme Court of California rejected
the privity test and held that third persons could recover from
an attorney where these third persons suffered economic loss
as a proximate result of the attorney's negligent legal practice.
As the Court noted:
[T]he determination whether in a specific case
the defendant will be held liable to a third person not
in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent
to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's
injury, and the policy of preventing
conduct and the
2
future harm.
In addition to potential liability to third persons, other
'

2

56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962).
Id. at 585, 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
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developments have contributed to the possible expansion of
liability. The law itself is constantly increasing in volume and
complexity, and clients are beginning to expect the attorney
to provide them with a larger variety of services. These
things tend to increase the probability that errors will occur,
and, as a result, clients demand a constantly increasing degree of protection from professional negligence. This may be
a never-ending cycle. The availability of professional liability
insurance offers protection on one hand but encourages suits
on the other, and the increased volume of these actions causes
a rise in the cost of purchasing such insurance.
The purpose of this article is to consider the elements that
make up a cause of action against an attorney for negligence.
Of necessity, an attorney's liability in regard to cases relating
to ethics, conflicts of interest, conversion, embezzlement, contempt, and the improper handling of criminal actions will not
be discussed.
THE ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
According to the late Dean Prosser, the traditional elements necessary for a cause of action in negligence are:
1) A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law,
requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard
of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2) A failure on the part of the actor to conform
to the standard required. These two elements go to
make up what the courts usually have called negligence; but the term quite frequently is applied to the
second alone. Thus it may be said that the defendant
was negligent, but is not liable because he was under
no duty to the plaintiff not to be.
3) A reasonably close causal connection between
the conduct and the resulting injury. This is what is
commonly known as "legal cause" or "proximate
cause."
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4) Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests
of another 3
Oklahoma requires that similar elements be established in
order to recover against an attorney for negligence. The plaintiff must prove:
1) The existence of the attorney-client relationship.
2) A breach of duty.
3) The attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of
the injury.
4) Actual damages.

4

THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
As a general rule, the relation of attorney and client is
contractual in nature, but such a contract contains certain
unique and special features.5 It is a contract created by the
employment of an attorney possessing the authority necessary
to practice his profession, by a client competent to contract. 6
7
This relationship is not dependent on the payment of fees.
It is created by a valid offer and acceptance, and is either
in the form of an offer by the client and an acceptance by the
attorney, or an offer by the attorney and an acceptance by the
client. Form is not important, as formality is not an essential
element of the employment contract in general. Although a

8 W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 28, at 143 (4th
ed. 1971).
4 Collins v. Warner, 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963).

Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916); Kellogg
v. Kellogg, 166 N.Y.S. 417 (1917).
6 Wheatland v. Maloney, 110 Cal. App. 288, 294 P. 499 (1930);
Healy v. Gary, 184 Iowa 111, 168 N.W. 222 (1918); Ex parte
Schneider, 294 S.W. 736 (Mo. App. 1927).
7 Pyeatt v. Estus, 72 Okla. 160, 179 P. 42 (1916); Healy v.
Gary, 184 Iowa 111, 168 N.W. 222 (1918); Ex parte Schneider,
294 S.W. 736 (Mo. App. 1927).
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writing is always desirable, the contract may be written or
oral, expressed or implied.8
Once created, the relationship of attorney and client, and
the powers, rights and obligations arising therefrom, continue
until there has been a final and complete fulfillment of the
particular object or case for which the attorney was employed.9 As is the case in other employment contracts, the relationship may always be terminated by mutual agreement of
the parties. 10 It should be noted, however, that while a client
may discharge his attorney at any time, even without cause,"
an attorney cannot terminate services to his client without
cause and reasonable notice. 12 Depending upon the personal
nature of the contract and the types of entities involved, the
death 13 or insanity 4 of either party may also operate to terminate the employment contract.
It is the existence of the attorney-client relationship which
creates the "duty" element of a cause of action. It should be
noted, however, that the relationship of attorney and client
need not exist in order to justify disciplinary action for misconduct by a member of the bar. 15
8 Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969);
Lawrence v. Tschirgi, 244 Iowa 386, 57 N.W.2d 46 (1953);
Prigmore v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. of Minn., 225 S.W.2d
897 (Civ. App. 1949).
9 Calloway v. State, 117 Okla. 43, 246 P. 873 (1926); Sandall
v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093 (1920).
10 Poe v. Walker, 183 Ark. 659, 37 S.W.2d 866 (1931); Emerson-Grantingham Instrument Co. v. Olson, 56 S.D. 132, 227
N.W. 567 (1929).
11 White v. American Law Book Co., 106 Okla. 166, 233 P. 426
(1924).
12 McLaughlin v. Nettleton, 47 Okla. 407, 148 P. 987 (1915).
13 City of Barnsdall v. Curnutt, 198 Okla. 3, 174 P.2d 596 (1946);
Overstreet v. Overstreet. 319 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1958); Huddleston v. Wallow, 117 Okla. 259, 246 P. 585 (1926).
14 Corson v. Lewis, 77 Neb. 446, 109 N.W. 735 (1906); Sullivan
v. Dunne, 198 Cal. 183, 244 P. 343 (1926); Joost v. Racher,
148 Il. App. 548 (1909).
15 State v. Martin, 410 P.2d 49 (Okla. 1965).
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THE BREACH OF DUTY

When talking about "duty" and "breach of duty" we are
really talking about a standard of conduct. If the performance
in question falls below this standard we say that there has been
a breach of duty. The difficulty is in measuring this standard.
In non-professional negligence actions the standard of conduct
is defined in terms of that expected from an abstract and
mythical person known as the "reasonable man of ordinary
prudence."'16 Sometimes simply referred to as a reasonable
man,' 7 one writer described him as follows:
He is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all
those qualities which we demand of the good citizen.
... He is one who invariably looks where he is going,
and is careful to examine the immediate foreground
before he executes a leap or a bound; who neither
star-gazes nor is lost in meditation when approaching
trapdoors or the margin of a dock; . . . who never
mounts a moving omnibus and does not alight from
any car while the train is in motion... and will inform himself of the history and habits of a dog before
administering a caress; ... who never drives his ball
until those in front of him have definitely vacated
the putting-green which is his own objective; who
never from one year's end to another makes an excessive demand upon his wife, his neighbors, his servants, his ox, or his ass; ...who never swears, gambles
or loses his temper; who uses nothing except in moderation, and even while he flogs his child is meditating
only on the golden mean.... In all that mass of authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is
no single mention of a reasonable woman.'8
If there is such a thing as the "reasonable attorney," he
is apparently an even more magnanimous individual than
16 Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490
(1738).
1" Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Ex. 781, 156 Eng.
Rep. 1047 (1856).
18 A. HERBERT, MhSLEADING CASES IN TH
CommoN LAW 12-16
(1930).
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the reasonable man himself. For attorneys, and professional
men in general, are required not only to exercise reasonable
care, but to possess special knowledge and skill as well.10
Occasionally authority may be found suggesting that an
attorney will be held liable only where he is chargeable with
gross negligence. This is especially true in the earlier cases.20
It would appear, however, that the better rule, and the rule
that is presently followed in Oklahoma and a majority of
American jurisdictions, is that an attorney is liable to his
client for damages caused by a failure to exercise the ordinary
care, skill, and diligence which is exercised and possessed by
21
attorneys in practice in the jurisdiction.
It has been suggested that an attorney's liability in negligence is subject to the same tests used to determine a doctor's
liability, and, as a result, attorneys are required to exercise
the same degree of care and skill in the legal profession as
physicians and surgeons are required to exercise in the medical
22
profession.
An excellent summary of the principles relating to actions
23
for medical malpractice is set out in Smith v. Yohe:
1) [I]n the absence of a special contract, a physician neither warrants a cure nor guarantees the result of his treatment.
2) A physician who is not a specialist is required
to possess and employ in the treatment of a patient
the skill and knowledge usually possessed by physi19 Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958); Citizen's Loan Fund & Say. Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23
N.E. 1075 (1890); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.
2d 144 (1954).
20 Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W.2d 841
(1933).
21 Collins v. Warner, 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963); Sprague v.
Morgan, 185 Cal. App. 2d 519, 8 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1960).
2 Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
23 419 Pa. 94, 194 A.2d 167 (1963).
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cians [of good standing] in the same or a similar
locality giving due regard to the advanced state of the
profession at the time of the treatment; and in employing the required skill and knowledge he is also
required to exercise the care and judgment of a reasonable man.
3) [T]he burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to
prove either that the physician did not possess and
employ the required skill or knowledge or that he did
not exercise the care and judgment of a reasonable
man in like circumstances.
4) [T]he doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and exclusive control are not applicable in this area of the law.
5) [I]n malpractice cases which involve an appraisal of the care and skill of a physician a lay jury
presumably lacks the necessary knowledge and experience to render an intelligent decision without
expert testimony and must be guided by such expert
testimony. [T]he only exception to the requirement
that expert testimony must be produced is where the
matter under investigation is so simple, and the want
of skill or care so obvious, as to be within the range of
the ordinary experience and comprehension of even
non-professional persons.
6) [A] physical is not liable for an error of judgment if... [he] employs the required judgment and
care in arriving at his diagnosis, the mere fact that
he erred in his diagnosis will not render him liable,
even though his treatment24is not proper for the condition that actually exists.

Virtually the same provisions would appear to apply to
legal malpractice.
1) A lawyer is not an insurer of the outcome of a case
unless he makes a special contract to that effect.
2) An attorney engaging in the practice of law and contracting to prosecute on behalf of his client impliedly warrants
24 Id. at 98, 194 A.2d at 170-71.
2 Babbit v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417 (1889).
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that he possesses the requisite degree of knowledge, ability,
and skill necessary to practice his profession and which other
attorneys similarly situated normally possess, and that he will
exercise reasonable care and diligence. 26
3) The client has the burden of proving that he would have
been successful in the prosecution or defense of the action in
question were it not for the negligence of the attorney.27
4) The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to
28
legal malpractice.
5) The courts are split as to whether expert testimony
should be required to make out a prima facie case against an
attorney charged with malpractice. 29 For the most part, unlike
medical malpractice cases, actions against attorneys have rarely involved the question of the necessity of expert testimony.
This is due to the fact that the court itself sits as an expert
on the subject in such cases. It has been said that it is the
duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the want of skill
or degree of negligence for which the attorney will be held
answerable, and the duty that is imposed on him by law. It
is to be left to the jury to determine, upon all the facts and
circumstances of the case, whether the attorney has performed his duty. If they find he has not, they must determine
whether his neglect or want of skill was of a character or degree sufficient to render him liable to the client, in accordance
with the definitions furnished by the instructions of the
court.30 That is, it is for the court to determine the degree of
care required, and the care exercised is a question of fact to
be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the
court.31 Gambert v. Hart32 illustrates these principles in holding

Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954).
Collins v. Warner, 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963).
28 Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
29 Dorf v. leeles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966); Surity v. Lelner,
155 So. 2d 831 (Fla. App. 1963).
30 Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 A. 698 (1889).
81 Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d 509 (1951).
82 44 Cal. 542 (1872).
26
27
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that an expert witness may not testify that certain conduct
of an attorney constitutes professional negligence:
The (expert) witness was not called to prove any
fact in the case, and his evidence, if admitted, would
have been only an expression of his opinion, as an attorney, that the alleged acts or omissions of the defendant amounted to negligence in law. This was a
question for the court, and not for the witness to decide. The facts being admitted or proved, it was a
question of law for the court whether
they establish33
ed the negligence of the defendant.
An excellent restatement of the general rule as to liability of an attorney for negligence is set out in Glenn v.
Haynes:3 4
While there can be no doubt that for any misfeasance or unreasonable neglect of an attorney whereby his client suffers a loss an action may be supported and damages recovered to the amount of that loss,
yet it is equally well established that an attorney in
the management of his professional business is not
bound to extraordinary diligence, but only to use a
reasonable degree of care and skill, reference being
had to the character of the business he undertakes to
do, and is not to be answerable for every error or mistake, but, on the contrary, will be protected if he acts
in good faith, to the best of his skill and knowledge,
and with an ordinary degree of attention. While some
law writers and some adjudged cases state that an attorney is liable to his client for "gross negligence"
only, yet it would appear that even when such term
is used it merely means the want or absence of "reasonable care and skill."
A majority of jurisdictions follow the rule that an attorney is liable for damages resulting to his client which are
proximately caused by the attorney's failure to exercise the
degree of skill, care, and diligence which is commonly exercised and possessed by practicing attorneys in the jurisdiction
8 Id. at 549.
191 Va. 574, 577-78, 66 S.E.2d 509, 512-13 (1951).

34
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in which the client's cause of action arose. 5 But where the
attorney's negligence is predicated upon his alleged ignorance
of the law, the attorney will not be liable in negligence where
the question in issue is a controversial point of law and he
has reached a conclusion which has been proven erroneous
by a subsequent authoritative decision:
An attorney who acts in good faith and in an honest belief that his advice and acts are well founded
and in the best interest of his client is not answerable
for a mere error of judgment or for a mistake in a
point of law which has not been settled by the court
of last resort in his state and on which reasonable
doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers. 0
Failure to Observe Local Statutes and Decisions
As noted in the case of Citizens' Loan, Fund & Savings Associationv. Friedley 7 in which an attorney was being sued for
a mistake concerning the law applicable to the state of title on
a piece of mortgaged property, an attorney is not liable for
every error or mistake. But he will be liable if his client's interests suffer due to his failure to understand and apply those
rules and principles of law which are well established and
clearly defined in the elementary books, or those declared in
cases that have been duly reported, and published for a length
of time sufficient to have become known to those who exercise reasonable diligence in keeping pace with the literature of the legal profession. An attorney is without excuse
for being ignorant of the ordinary settled rules of pleading
and practice and of the statutes of his own state.
Negligence in Initiating and Conducting Litigation
In Boyle v. Krebs and Schulz Motors, Inc.8 8 where failure
to move to restore a case to the trial calendar within a speci15 Collins v. Warner, 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963).
80 Id. at 109.
87 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 1075 (1890).
88 18 App. Div. 2d 1010, 239 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1963).
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fied period after it was stricken was due primarily to neglect
of the plaintiff's attorney, the court held that the attorney
would be required to personally pay the costs of restoring
the case to the trial calendar. This decision echoes the language
of Gambert v. Hart,9 which stated that losses suffered by a
client as a result of his attorney's negligence in failing to prepare,' file or serve pleadings essential to the proper presentation of the client's cause were recoverable from the client's
attorney.
Negligence in Failing to Protect the Client's Right to Appeal
Pete v. Henderson40 illustrates the rule that a client can
recover damages for negligence in permitting a judgment
rendered against him to become final if he can show that
an appeal would have resulted in a judgment more favorable
to the client.
An attorney may also be held liable for taking an appeal
which he should have realized would be completely fruitless.
In the case of In Re Hegarty's Estate41 the court pointed out
that the statute was clear as to the length of time required
for giving notice, and it would have to be assumed that the
attorneys knew of the statutory provision in question and that
they could count. Therefore, they had no excuse for putting
their client to the expense of a hopeless appeal.
Negligence in Handling Collections
As illustrated in a recent Mississippi decision involving
an action against an attorney for negligence in allegedly permitting the statute of limitations to run against suit on open
account, the supreme court of that state held that the amount
of actual loss sustained by the client as a result of the attorney's negligence was a question for the jury. The court stated:
In a suit by a client against an attorney for neg89 44 Cal. 542 (1872).
40 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954).
41 47 Nev. 369, 222 P. 793 (1924).
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ligence in conducting the collection of a claim, whereby the debt was lost, the burden rests on the former
to allege and prove every fact essential to establish
such liability. He must allege and prove that the claim
was turned over to the attorney for collection; that
there was a failure to collect; that this failure was due
to the culpable neglect of the attorney; and that, but
for such negligence, the debt could, or would, have
been collected. Hence, where a claim is alleged to
have been lost by an attorney's negligence, in order
to recover more than nominal damages it must be
shown that it was a valid subsisting debt, and that
the debtor was solvent.4 2
Negligence in the Preparationand Recordation
of Legal Documents
In Degen v. Steinbrink, 43 an attorney employed to draft
a mortgage to establish a lien on property outside of the state
was held liable to his client for failure to draw the mortgage
so as to comply with the statutes of the other state. The court
pointed out that although a lawyer was not presumed to know
the statutes of another state, he was presumed to know that
the statutory law of one state usually differs from the statutory law of another. When he undertakes the preparation of
papers to be filed in a foreign state, if he has no knowledge of
that state's statutes, it is his duty to inform himself, for, like an
artisan, when he undertakes work he represents that he can
perform it in a skillful and capable manner.
An attorney will be held liable for negligent failure to
record papers and will be responsible for any damage resulting from his negligence.44
42 Thompson v. Erving's Hatcheries, Inc., 186 So. 2d 756, 759
(Miss. 1966).
4s 202 App. Div. 477, 195 N.Y.S. 810 (1922).
44 See Stuart v. Walkup, 114 N.Y.S. 483 (App. T. 1909).
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Negligent Handling of Funds Collected for the Client
When an attorney collects money for a client, the former impliedly agrees that he will promptly pay this money over
to the latter. Collection of money by an attorney for his client
is analogous to the receipt of personal property. The rules that
govern his liability for the loss of the client's property received are precisely the same as those which govern in the case
of a trustee. In the event of loss, he will not be excused unless he exercises the same caution in protecting his client's
property as a prudent man would exercise in the protection
of his own property of like character.45
Negligence in Title Search
As legal advice often becomes necessary in purchasing
and conveying real property, it is a well settled rule that an
attorney may be held liable to his client for his negligence
in investigating and examining the title to real property where
said attorney is employed for that undertaking. This rule is
applicable whether the examination is for the prospective
46
purchaser, the grantor, or a prospective lender.
Acting Beyond Scope of Authority
Where an attorney has been disobedient to the proper instructions of his client, he will be held liable for any loss
resulting in consequence of such disobedience. As stated in
Cornell v. Edsen,4 7 where an attorney wrongfully dismissed a
cause of action which he had been employed to prosecute, the
client's right to recover depends, not upon the attorney's fraud
and misrepresentation, but upon his breach of professional
duty, and would exist even where the breach was unintentional.
45 Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d 509 (1951).
46 National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1897).
47 78 Wash. 662, 139 P. 602 (1914).
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THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
Before a client can recover damages against an attorney
for negligence it must appear that the negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury which resulted to the client.
Generally speaking, the attorney may not be held liable unless it appears that the client would have been successful if
the action had been properly prosecuted or defended. 48
In a malpractice action, it is the client who must bear
the burden of proof. There is no presumption that an attorney
has been guilty of a lack of skill or want of care arising merely from the fact that he failed to be successful in an undertaking. Until the contrary has been made to appear, he is
presumed to have discharged his duty, whether moral or le49
gal, until proven otherwise.

Applying these principles to an action by a client against
his attorney for malpractice, even if the attorney was negligent in the defense of the suit, the attorney will not be
liable if the client would not have recovered regardless of
0
the care exercised by the attorney.G
DAMAGES
The action for negligence developed mainly out of the
old form of action on the case. As a result, it retained the rule
that an essential element of the plaintiff's case was proof of
damages.8 ' In a malpractice action, the proper element of damages is the amount the client would have recovered had it
not been for the attorney's negligence,52 or the amount of the
Sutton v. Whiteside, 101 Okla. 79, 222 P. 974 (1924).
49 Lynch v. Munson, 61 S.W. 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) (dictum).
11 Masters v. Dunston, 256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962)
(dictum).
51 W. PRossFR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 143
(4th ed. 1971).
52 Lally v. Kuster, 177 Cal. 783, 171 P. 961 (1918).
48
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judgment suffered by the client. 53 Fees which are paid to an
attorney entrusted with litigation 4 and expenses the client
incurred as a result of the attorney's negligence are also
proper elements of damage which the client may recover. 55
In Jamison v. Weaver, 5 the client was allowed to recover
costs from his attorney that were charged to the client on
appeal because the attorney failed to prosecute the appeal.
The court said that the damages were the direct result of a
breach of duty on the part of the attorney, even though the
client might have been held for other costs if the appeal had
been pressed.
Where title to property is lost, presumptively the value
of the property is the proper measure of damages. In Whitney
v. Abbott,

7

the client engaged an attorney to bring suit on a

conditional sales contract. The client instructed the attorney
that he did not wish to lose title to the property, but wanted
to recover the purchase price rather than the property. When
the attorney brought suit for the entire purchase price although some of the installments were not yet due, this in effect recognized the sale as absolute and waived the client's
title under the conditional sales contract. The court held that
the attorney was liable in damages for the market value of
the property at the time of bringing the suit which deprived
the client of title.
A client will not be prevented from recovering against
an attorney even in an action based on an unliquidated claim,58
but apparently the client will have to undertake the proof of
two actions in one. In such cases, the jury in the malpractice
action is without the benefit of evidence which presumably
53

Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954).

54

Id.

5 French v. Armstrong, 80 N.J.L. 152, 76 A. 336 (1910).
56081 Iowa 212, 46 N.W. 996 (1890).
57

191 Mass. 59, 77 N.E. 524 (1906).

Is King v. Fourchy, 47 La. Ann. 354, 16 So. 814 (1895).
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would have been introduced by the opposing party in the
original action, where the effect of the negligence of the attorney was to prevent that action.
As stated in Patterson & Wallace v. Frazer:59
It is known that judgments for damages, actual
and exemplary, are recovered and collected for slander, and it will not do to say that attorneys at law are
not liable to their clients for negligence in managing
such cases, because of the difficulty a jury may have
in arriving at the damages occasioned by such negligence, for this would absolve them from all liability
for negligence in such cases. To deny an injured party
the right to recover actual damages in cases of this
character, because they are of a nature that cannot
be certainly measured, would be to enable the defendants to profit by and speculate upon their own
wrongs.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Surprisingly, unlike the other traditional defenses in negligence actions such as the statute of limitations and release,
claims of fault on the part of the client, or contributory negligence, seldom arise in negligence actions against attorneys.
Perhaps this is because the client, normally, has placed the
attorney in complete control of the direction of the proceedings. There are, however, a few cases where the conduct of
the client was a factor in absolving the lawyer from liability.
In the Oklahoma case of Tishomingo Electric Light & Power Co. v. Gullett60 the attorney was charged with negligent
and careless inattention to his professional duties in that he
did not file an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of
Oklahoma until after the time to commence such proceedings had expired. As a result, the proceedings were dismissed
59 93 S.W. 146, 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) rev'd on other
grounds, 100 Tex. 103, 94 S.W. 324 (1906).
60 52 Okla. 180, 152 P. 849 (1915).
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and the client was compelled to pay a judgment of $1,564.90.
The court rendered a judgment in favor of the attorney when
it became apparent that the delay in filing the appeal was
the result of the client's wish to delay the proceedings as long
as possible so that he could avoid payment of the judgment.
The court held that in such a situation, where there had never
been any actual intention on the part of the client to appeal,
a verdict in favor of the defendant attorney was proper.
In Salisbury v. Gourgas,61 where an attorney was charged
with negligence in failing to defend an action, the attorney
stated that he had no defense to make because his client had
not given him the necessary information to do so. The judge
thereupon instructed the jury that the attorney's statements
were not evidence of the truth of the facts stated, but were
admissible to show the surrounding circumstances that occurred at the time of the alleged negligence.
Patterson& Wallace v. Frazer62 concerned an action against
attorneys for alleged negligence in failing to file a bond. As
a result of said failure, the client's action was dismissed after
the statute of limitations had run. The court held that an instruction was not objectionable in defining contributory negligence as a negligent act or omission on the part of the client
which concurs or cooperates with a negligent act or omission
on the part of the attorneys which was the proximate cause
of the injury or damages complained of, providing that the
members of the jury were otherwise instructed that if they
believed that the client was in fact guilty of negligence in
failing to secure the bond herself the verdict should be for
the attorneys, as the client's contributory negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss.
93 S.W. 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), rev'd on other grounds,
100 Tex. 103, 94 S.W. 324 (1906).
61 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 442 (1845).
62
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CONCLUSION
It goes without saying that the foregoing article necessarily leaves some unanswered questions in regard to an attorney's professional liability.
Although the medical-legal malpractice analogy will undoubtedly continue to be a guiding factor in the development
of legal malpractice concepts, one must question the propriety
and validity of such an analogy. Attorneys and physicians can
both be classified as professional men, and both are required
not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but to
possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability
as well. But to go beyond these points of comparison one must
overlook significant differences between the medical and legal
professions.
While medicine is a science, law is a practical art. In
deciding how to best serve his client, an attorney must take
into account a number of considerations that a physician need
not be concerned with. Proper medical treatment does not vary
with the peculiarities and prejudices of judges and jurors or
the political, racial, and social characteristics of a particular
community. An attorney, on the other hand, must weigh each
of these variables carefully, and in many cases must give more
weight to his client's financial situation than to all of the other
variables combined.
These considerations, along with the constantly increasing
volume and complexity of the law, require todays lawyer to
maintain an ever higher level of expertise in order to meet
the greater levels of care and skill required of him. For the
lawyer who fails to meet these requirements, there is an increasing probability that he will find himself in a courtroom
in a role to which he is not accustomed.
Gary L. Putnam
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